Interconnecting Legal
Systems and the
Autonomous EU Legal
Order: A Balloon Dynamic. Research Paper in Law 02/2018 by Govaere, Inge
DEPARTMENT OF 
EUROPEAN LEGAL STUDIES
02 / 2018Research Paper in Law
Interconnecting Legal 
Systems and the 
Autonomous EU Legal 
Order: A Balloon Dynamic
Inge Govaere
  
 
European Legal Studies 
Etudes Juridiques Européennes 
 
 
RESEARCH PAPERS IN LAW 
 
2/2018 
 
Inge Govaere 
 
Interconnecting Legal Systems and the Autonomous EU Legal Order:  
A Balloon Dynamic 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Inge Govaere, 2018 
 
 
 
European Legal Studies/Etudes Juridiques Européennes 
Dijver 11 | BE-8000 Brugge, Belgium | Tel. +32 (0)50 47 72 61  
www.coleurope.eu 
  
Interconnecting Legal Systems and the Autonomous EU Legal Order: A 
Balloon Dynamic* 
 
 
Inge Govaere** 
 
 
I. The Balloon Dynamic of the Autonomous EU Legal Order 
 
The concept of the new and autonomous EU legal order, as it emanated from the historic 
Van Gend & Loos judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU),1 can best be 
pictured as an empty balloon firmly slid in-between public international law and constitutional 
law.2 At first this would sit somewhat uneasily and create some friction, but it would 
not yet raise any major concerns. More important frictions with international law 
however started to appear with the rapid expansion of the EU integration process 
both in terms of substantive coverage and territorial scope, due to the constant 
transfer of competence towards the EU, coupled with the EU enlargement process to 
include new Member States. The balloon imagery goes that with every such new EU 
development, more air is automatically blown into the balloon. Yet strongly inflating 
the EU balloon has as a direct consequence that also more and more international 
law (and Member States’ constitutional law) is systematically squeezed out. It is this 
gradual but steady EU integration process which inevitably causes increased friction 
and possibly even resistance against a further expansion of the autonomous EU legal 
order. Not surprisingly, the biggest friction is likely to relate to the transfer of areas which 
for a long time were kept outside the EU law balloon and within the sole realm of 
international law.  
 Concurrently, the EU legal order, as any balloon, gets more fragile when 
inflated. The necessity to shield the balloon from ‘external puncturing’ and its ensuing 
deflation, for instance in terms of forum shopping for dispute settlement, therefore 
also becomes all the stronger. It was argued before that this gradual EU integration 
process most likely explains why the crucial debate on EU law compatibility of ISDS 
in the new and comprehensive EU free trade agreements, such as TTIP, CETA and 
EUSFTA, has only recently arisen.3 The underlying trigger is undoubtedly the express 
inclusion of foreign direct investments in Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) by the Lisbon Treaty, thus unequivocally conferring exclusive 
common commercial policy competence in the matter to the EU.4 In so doing, a field 
traditionally governed by international law was for the first time brought firmly within 
the balloon of the autonomous EU legal order. In the much awaited Opinion 1/17, the 
questions posed by Belgium pertain to the compatibility of the ISDS provisions in 
                                                          
* The final version will be published in the book: I Govaere and S Garben (eds), The Interface between 
EU and International Law: Contemporary Reflections, Hart Publishing, 2018 (forthcoming). 
** Inge Govaere is Jean Monnet Chair in EU Legal Studies and Director of the Ghent European law 
Institute (G.E.L.I.) at Ghent University and Director of the European Legal Studies Department, 
College of Europe, Bruges.   
1 Case 32/84 Van Gend & Loos ECLI:EU:C:1985:104. 
2 This ‘balloon dynamic’ was first presented at the 2016 FIDE congress in Budapest, see I 
Govaere, ‘TTIP and Dispute Settlement: Potential Consequences for the Autonomous EU Legal Order’ 
in G Bándi, P Barak, K Debisso (eds), Speeches and Presentations from the XXVII FIDE Congress, 
Congress Proceedings Vol 4, 2016, 123–44. 
3 For opposing views, see for instance E-U Petersmann, ‘Transformative Transatlantic Free Trade 
Agreements without Rights and Remedies of Citizens?’ (2015) Journal of International Economic Law 
579–607; R Quick, ‘Why TTIP Should Have an Investment Chapter Including ISDS’ (2015) Journal of 
World Trade 199–209. 
4 I Govaere, ‘TTIP and Dispute Settlement: Potential Consequences for the Autonomous EU Legal 
Order’ (2016) 1 College of Europe Research Papers in Law 5–6. 
  
CETA with the autonomous EU legal order post-Lisbon.5 Advisory Opinion 1/00 on 
the European Common Aviation Area shows, however, that it does not suffice to 
raise questions in terms of possible incompatibility with the EU autonomous legal 
order for the CJEU also to conclude in that sense;6 the assessment is much more 
refined and complex. 
 Such a complex balloon dynamic process warrants the following threefold 
analysis. First of all, it is crucial to remember the very raison d’être of the EU law 
balloon and the mechanisms underlying its inflation, so as to understand why and 
how the CJEU coined the concept of ‘autonomous EU legal order’ in Van Gend & 
Loos.7 Many studies and conferences have already been devoted to the study of Van 
Gend & Loos so this will not be repeated here.8 Second, in order to avoid puncturing 
the balloon membrane it is crucial to pinpoint clearly the structural pressures that rest 
on the autonomous EU legal order. Third, it needs to be considered what the 
possible degree of resilience or elasticity of the EU balloon membrane can be in 
terms of offering substantive remedies to avoid conflict. The latter two elements are 
necessarily and inherently intertwined in any single legal analysis performed by the 
CJEU. The structural membrane serves to safeguard the ‘autonomy’ of the EU legal 
order so that, not surprisingly, the CJEU will strive for a strict division and a 
‘hermetically closed’ EU law system. Yet in order to forge acceptance thereof, the 
CJEU needs, at the same time, to be seen to strive for ‘openness’ and ‘symbioses’ 
with the other legal systems in terms of substantive resilience/elasticity, in relation to 
both constitutional law of the Member States and international law (including the UN, 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR)). This contribution will systematically deconstruct those last two 
distinct yet stringently interrelated elements before turning to the key question in the 
current Post-Lisbon setting: will the EU balloon likely continue to fly or deflate? 
 The Lisbon Treaty now expressly states among the EU objectives in Article 
3(5) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) that the Union ‘... shall contribute to (…) 
the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United 
Nations Charter’. Upon an isolated reading of this new provision of primary EU law, it 
could be claimed that this objective should always and necessarily take the upper 
hand and in every instance be given a full effect. The question still remains if, and if 
so to what extent, in so-doing concessions can or should be made to safeguard the 
autonomy of the EU legal order, which also derives its logic from primary EU law. 
Another possibility is more simply to read a codification of consistent case law of the 
CJEU into this new provision. As an international actor with legal personality the EU 
should then in its dealings with third countries and other international organisations 
comply with and contribute to the international legal order, short of any obligation to 
turn the EU into a traditional ‘state like’ subject of international law, let alone yielding 
core features of EU law to international law. There is no doubt that the insertion of 
                                                          
5 The questions addressed by Belgium to the CJEU are the following: ‘Specifically, the Kingdom of 
Belgium is requesting the CJEU to provide an opinion regarding the compatibility of the ICS with: 
1) The exclusive competence of the CJEU to provide the definitive interpretation of European 
Union law 
2) The general principle of equality and the “practical effect” requirement of European Union law 
3) The right of access to the courts 
4) The right to an independent and impartial judiciary’ 
see ‘CETA: Belgian Request for an Opinion from the European Court of Justice’ at 
https://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/newsroom/news/2017/minister_reynders_submits_request_opinion_cet
a (last accessed 11 September 2018). 
6 Opinion 1/00 ECAA ECLI:EU:C:2002:231. The CJEU came to the conclusion that ‘The system of 
legal supervision proposed by the Agreement on the establishment of a European Common Aviation 
Area in Articles 17, 23 and 27 and Protocol IV is compatible with the EC Treaty’. 
7 Van Gend & Loos (n 1). 
8 See, amongst others, CJEU, ‘50th Anniversary of the Judgment in Van Gend en Loos’ 1963–
2013, Conference proceedings, Luxembourg, 13 May 2013, EU publications. 
  
this provision in the Lisbon Treaty contains ample potential to refuel a difficult 
discussion.  
 In order to grasp the complexity, dynamics and current challenges facing this 
interconnecting process, it is crucial that the place of the autonomous EU legal order 
in the larger international legal setting is subjected to a dynamic reassessment on its 
own merits and, importantly, free from hindsight reasoning. The focus lies on a one-
sided analysis, exclusively from an EU law perspective. Equally crucial and 
interesting questions emerging from a complementary international law perspective, 
such as determining the impact of EU law on international law and the 
‘accommodation’ of the EU by other international organisations, will thus be left 
aside. By way of additional caveat, as the focus is exclusively put on an EU legal 
analysis, mainly trying to understand the logic of the CJEU, political and economic 
issues of interconnecting legal orders will only be considered as contextually 
important but not form the focus of analysis as such.  
 
II. Structural Pressure on the Balloon Membrane 
 
A lot of attention has traditionally gone on the study of the (intra-balloon) 
development of EU law, looking at the specificities and subject matters of EU law.9 
This concerns the essential and distinctive characteristics of EU law, namely 
primacy, direct effect and uniform interpretation by the CJEU,10 but also transfer of 
competence to the EU in various and ever increasing fields.11 The balloon dynamic of 
interaction between EU law and international law is not, however, limited to the 
process of inflation of the balloon with its ongoing shift in competence towards the 
EU. It also, if not foremost, points to the need to maintain intact a balloon membrane 
surrounding that ever expanding autonomous EU legal order. Seen from this 
perspective, the role of the CJEU in safeguarding a hermetically closed system of EU 
law appears to be crucial for the very survival of the authenticity of the autonomous 
EU legal order. The common feature to be discerned in the CJEU’s approach is that 
it seeks to prevent any ‘direct’ interference of international law within the EU balloon, 
unless it has been expressly endorsed as ‘integrated’ or ‘incorporated’ into the EU 
legal order.12 The challenges here are twofold for the EU legal order as set up by Van 
Gend & Loos and continue to be subject to both internal and external structural 
pressures, and also following the Lisbon Treaty. First, the CJEU’s approach to the 
structural internal pressure post-Lisbon will be briefly pinpointed and some (wider) 
lessons drawn, before turning to the highly topical issue of increasing external 
structure pressure. 
 
A. Structural Internal Pressure and the Rule of ‘EU’ Law 
 
From within, the structural pressure on the hermetically closed EU law system 
essentially comes from the intergovernmental elements surviving the abolishment of 
the pillar structure by the Lisbon Treaty in CFSP matters. The crux of the 
autonomous EU legal order consists in preserving the unique position bestowed 
upon the CJEU by the Treaties. Articles 19 TEU and 344 TFEU combined confer 
exclusive jurisdiction to the CJEU, thereby as a rule preventing forum shopping and 
                                                          
9 See, eg, A Rosas, L Armati, EU Constitutional Law, an Introduction (Hart Publishing, 2018); R 
Schütze, European Union Law (Cambridge University Press, 2015).  
10 See, eg, KJ Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law: The Making of an International 
Rule of Law in Europe (Oxford University Press, 2010); S Weatherill, Law and Values in the European 
Union (Oxford University Press, 2016). 
11 On this issue, see S Garben and I Govaere (eds), The Division of Competences between the 
European Union and its Member States: Reflections on the Past, Present and Future (Hart Publishing, 
2017). 
12 See below. 
  
excluding any form of international dispute settlement in relation to the intra-balloon 
issues of EU law. An important exception thereto is still to be found in the ‘horizontal 
pillar’ of CFSP,13 in principle excluding CJEU jurisdiction for CFSP matters other than 
Article 40 TEU14 and restrictive measures against natural or legal persons (Articles 
24(1) TEU15 and 275 TFEU16). As such, whereas the political power to act is shifted 
from the Member States to the EU, the judicial control mechanism continues to 
remain outside the EU legal order.17 Judicial control over CFSP measures thus lies 
primarily with the domestic courts of the Member States as well as international 
courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).18 
 According to the Treaties, the CFSP is thus sort of half in and half out of the 
EU law balloon. It is to a large extent kept outside judicial control by the CJEU in 
favour of political control mainly by the Council and the High Representative.19 
Nonetheless, the CJEU uses its general jurisdiction to ensure the rule of law under 
Article 19 TEU in order to minimise the possible negative impact thereof on the 
autonomous EU legal system. It does so in two ways, one in relation to CFSP 
agreements, the other relating to autonomous CFSP decisions.  
                                                          
13 See I Govaere, ‘Multi-faceted Single Legal Personality and a Hidden Horizontal Pillar: EU 
External Relations Post-Lisbon’ (2010–2011) 13 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 87–
112. 
14 Art 40 TEU: ‘The implementation of the common foreign and security policy shall not affect the 
application of the procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid down by the Treaties 
for the exercise of the Union competences referred to in Articles 3 to 6 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union. 
Similarly, the implementation of the policies listed in those Articles shall not affect the application of 
the procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid down by the Treaties for the exercise 
of the Union competences under this Chapter.’ 
15 Art 24(1) TEU stipulates: ‘The Union’s competence in matters of common foreign and security 
policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union’s security, including 
the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence.  
The common foreign and security policy is subject to specific rules and procedures. It shall be 
defined and implemented by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where 
the Treaties provide otherwise. The adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded. The common foreign 
and security policy shall be put into effect by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy and by Member States, in accordance with the Treaties. The specific role of the 
European Parliament and of the Commission in this area is defined by the Treaties. The Court of Justice 
of the European Union shall not have jurisdiction with respect to these provisions, with the exception of 
its jurisdiction to monitor compliance with Article 40 of this Treaty and to review the legality of certain 
decisions as provided for by the second paragraph of Article 275 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union.’ 
16 Art 275 TFEU reads as follows: ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union shall not have 
jurisdiction with respect to the provisions relating to the common foreign and security policy nor with 
respect to acts adopted on the basis of those provisions. 
However, the Court shall have jurisdiction to monitor compliance with Article 40 of the Treaty on 
European Union and to rule on proceedings, brought in accordance with the conditions laid down in the 
fourth paragraph of Article 263 of this Treaty, reviewing the legality of decisions providing for restrictive 
measures against natural or legal persons adopted by the Council on the basis of Chapter 2 of Title V of 
the Treaty on European Union.’ 
17 I have labelled this elsewhere as ‘crippled’ conferral, see I Govaere, ‘To Give or to Grab: The 
Principle of Full, Crippled and Split Conferral of Powers Post-Lisbon’ in M Cremona (ed), Structural 
Principles in EU External Relations Law (Hart Publishing, 2018) 71–91. 
18 See, eg, ECtHR, MSS v Belgium and Greece, Application No 30696/09, Judgment of 21 January 
2011, at para 338: ‘The Court notes the reference to the Bosphorus judgment (…). The Court found that 
the protection of fundamental rights afforded by Community law was equivalent to that provided by the 
Convention system (ibid, § 165). In reaching that conclusion it attached great importance to the role and 
powers of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEC) – now the CJEU – in the matter, 
considering in practice that the effectiveness of the substantive guarantees of fundamental rights 
depended on the mechanisms of control set in place to ensure their observance (ibid, § 160). The Court 
also took care to limit the scope of the Bosphorus judgment to Community law in the strict sense – at the 
time the “first pillar” of European Union law (§ 72).’ 
19 Art 24(3) TEU. 
  
 First of all, the CJEU deftly uses the unitary procedure for the conclusion of 
agreements as laid down in Article 218 TFEU, ‘an autonomous and general provision 
of constitutional scope’,20 to try to ensure some coherence in terms of the level of 
judicial and democratic control within the broader EU law balloon.21 The CJEU thus 
refutes the arguments of the Council to the effect that it would totally lack jurisdiction 
as soon as it concerns a CFSP agreement. Instead, it points out that an exception to 
the rule of general jurisdiction conferred upon the CJEU by Article 19 TEU should 
necessarily be restrictively interpreted.22 
 In the same vein, the CJEU in the Rosneft case23 firmly claimed jurisdiction to 
give preliminary rulings on the validity of unilateral  decisions adopted in relation to 
the CFSP  prescribing restrictive measures against natural or legal persons, in spite 
of the express Treaty reference only to Article 263 TFEU procedures in that respect. 
The reasoning employed is as follows: 
Since the purpose of the procedure that enables the Court to give preliminary rulings 
is to ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is 
observed, in accordance with the duty assigned to the Court under Article 19(1) TEU, 
it would be contrary to the objectives of that provision and to the principle of effective 
judicial protection to adopt a strict interpretation of the jurisdiction conferred on the 
Court by the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU, to which reference is made by 
Article 24(1) TEU.24 
 Two distinct lessons can be drawn from those cases, one specific to CFSP 
and one more generally applicable to the specificity of EU law as compared to 
international law.  
 First, although those two remedies fall short of giving the CJEU full jurisdiction 
with respect to CFSP, they go a long way towards including CFSP matters in the 
autonomous EU legal order balloon, thereby somewhat alleviating the structural 
internal pressure. The exact extent of the CJEU’s CFSP interpretation exercise is not 
yet fully in view.25 But, as the CJEU may not engage in contra legem interpretation of 
express Treaty provisions, certain CFSP matters are bound to remain outside the EU 
balloon at least until a further Treaty amendment. This then implies that for those 
aspects of CFSP, legal control if any will continue to be effected at the sole national 
and international level, including by the ECtHR.26 The importance of the CJEU 
judicial review of Article 40 TEU in terms of qualifying the external action of the EU as 
CFSP-based or not therefore also remains high post-Lisbon.   
Second and perhaps more importantly, the more general lesson to be drawn 
is that the reasoning employed in both cases relies heavily on the role attributed by 
                                                          
20 Case C‑ 425/13 Commission v Council (Negotiating directives) ECLI:EU:C:2015:483, para 62. 
21 See Case C‑ 658/11 EP v Commission (Mauritius Agreement) ECLI:EU:C:2016:435; Case 
C‑ 263/14 EP v Council (Tanzania Agreement) ECLI:EU:C:2016:435. 
22 Mauritius Agreement, ibid, at para 70: ‘Nevertheless, the final sentence of the second 
subparagraph of Article 24(1) TEU and the first paragraph of Article 275 TFEU introduce a derogation 
from the rule of the general jurisdiction which Article 19 TEU confers on the Court to ensure that in the 
interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed, and they must, therefore, be 
interpreted narrowly.’ 
23 Case C‑ 72/15 Rosneft ECLI:EU:C:2017:236. For an analysis, see S Poli, ‘The Common 
Foreign Security Policy after Rosneft: Still Imperfect but Gradually Subject to the Rule of Law’ (2017) 
Common Market Law Review 1799–1834. 
24 Rosneft, ibid, at para 75. 
25 See, eg, C Hillion, R Wessel, ‘The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Three Levels of Judicial Control 
over the CFSP’ in S Blockmans and P Koutrakos (eds), Research Handbook on EU Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming 2018); R Wessel, ‘Integration and 
Constitutionalisation in EU Foreign and Security Policy’ in R Schülze (ed), Governance and 
Globalization (Cambridge University Press, at press); G Butler, ‘The Coming of Age of the Court’s 
Jurisdiction in the Common Foreign and Security Policy’ (2017) European Constitutional Law Review 
673–703. 
26 See also ECtHR, MSS v Belgium and Greece (n 18). 
  
Article 19 TEU to the CJEU to safeguard and to enforce respect for the rule of 
specifically ‘EU’ law. The CJEU made it amply clear already in Advisory Opinion 2/13 
on the accession of the EU to the ECHR that it is not sufficient for the EU, under 
CFSP, to comply with the rule of law under control of the ECHR, in particular if at the 
same time compliance with the rule of ‘EU’ law through the CJEU was not 
guaranteed.27 The Rosneft case further imposes a combined reading under Article 19 
TEU of the duty of the CJEU to ensure full respect of EU law with the CJEU’s earlier 
finding, in Les Verts,28 that the EU Treaties set up a ‘complete’ and coherent system 
of effective judicial remedies in which also the national judges fulfil a crucial role 
through the preliminary reference procedure.29 As both Opinion 1/0930 and the recent 
Achmea31 case seem to confirm, any attempt to withdraw jurisdiction from the 
national courts in relation to areas covered by intra-EU balloon matters is therefore 
also likely to fall foul of the EU autonomous legal order.32  
 
B. Structural External Pressure 
 
The latter finding illustrates that it is mainly the external structural pressure coming 
from more traditional international law settings that forces the CJEU to define what 
precisely constitutes the autonomy of the EU legal order which may not be affected 
by international law. The criticism towards cases such as the Kadi33 saga, Opinion 
2/13,34 as well as the discussions triggered by Achmea,35 has exposed the 
                                                          
27 Opinion 2/13 EU Accession to ECHR ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454 para 254–57: ‘254. Nevertheless, 
on the basis of accession as provided for by the agreement envisaged, the ECtHR would be empowered 
to rule on the compatibility with the ECHR of certain acts, actions or omissions performed in the context 
of the CFSP, and notably of those whose legality the Court of Justice cannot, for want of jurisdiction, 
review in the light of fundamental rights.  
255. Such a situation would effectively entrust the judicial review of those acts, actions or 
omissions on the part of the EU exclusively to a non-EU body, albeit that any such review would be 
limited to compliance with the rights guaranteed by the ECHR. 
256. The Court has already had occasion to find that jurisdiction to carry out a judicial review of 
acts, actions or omissions on the part of the EU, including in the light of fundamental rights, cannot be 
conferred exclusively on an international court which is outside the institutional and judicial framework of 
the EU (see, to that effect, Opinion 1/09, EU:C:2011:123, paragraphs 78, 80 and 89). 
257. Therefore, although that is a consequence of the way in which the Court’s powers are 
structured at present, the fact remains that the agreement envisaged fails to have regard to the specific 
characteristics of EU law with regard to the judicial review of acts, actions or omissions on the part of the 
EU in CFSP matters.’ 
28 Case 294/83 Les Verts v European Parliament EU:C:1986:166. 
29 Rosneft (n 23) at para 76: ‘In those circumstances, provided that the Court has, under Article 
24(1) TEU and the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU, jurisdiction ex ratione materiae to rule on the 
validity of European Union acts, that is, in particular, where such acts relate to restrictive measures 
against natural or legal persons, it would be inconsistent with the system of effective judicial protection 
established by the Treaties to interpret the latter provision as excluding the possibility that the courts and 
tribunals of Member States may refer questions to the Court on the validity of Council decisions 
prescribing the adoption of such measures.’ 
30 Opinion 1/09 European and Community Patents Court ECLI:EU:C:2011:123. 
31 Case C-284/16 Achmea ECLI:EU:C:2018:158. 
32 Unless the alternative dispute settlement method introduced may be fully equated with a 
domestic court of the Member States for the sake of Art 267 TFEU procedures, including as regards 
forging compliance with the duty to refer. 
33 For the appeal judgments of the CJEU, see Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi I 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:461; Joined Cases C‑ 584/10 P, C‑ 593/10 P and C‑ 595/10 P Kadi II 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:518. The Kadi saga quickly triggered much doctrine, see, eg, the overview given in S 
Poli, M Tzanou, ‘The Kadi Rulings: A Survey of the Literature’ (2009) Yearbook of European Law 533–
58; A Cuyvers, ‘“Give Me One Good Reason”: The Unified Standard of Review for Sanctions after Kadi 
II’ (2014) Common Market Law Review 1759–88; C Gearty, ‘In Praise of Awkwardness: Kadi in the 
CJEU’ (2014) European Constitutional Law Review 15–27.  
34 See, eg, P Eeckhout, ‘Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR and Judicial Dialogue: 
Autonomy or Autarky’ (2015) Fordham International Law Journal 995; E Spaventa, ‘A Very Fearful 
  
conceptual difficulty of maintaining a closed EU law balloon which is hermetically 
shielded from international law. The crucial question appears to be whether one can 
or should be able to identify situations whereby the possibility of forum shopping 
between the application of EU law or international law is at all warranted. Should UN 
law and obligations be singled out as such a special case, in particular in view of the 
above mentioned reference thereto in Article 3(5) TEU? What about the ECHR as 
expressly mentioned in Article 6 TEU? Or should, in keeping with the zest of the 
Lisbon Treaty, the question perhaps be answered positively as soon as other 
subjects of international law, in particular states, would be willing to engage in such a 
forum shopping exercise regardless of the subject matter? The reasoning then goes 
that the maturing of the EU into a forceful international actor as envisaged by the 
Lisbon Treaty necessarily implies that, within its competence, it may assume all 
rights and obligations as if it were a state. The key question is, of course, whether in 
a post-Lisbon setting the EU may really simply be equated with a state, or whether it 
still has distinct characteristics and special features that need to be reckoned with. 
 The Lisbon Treaty continues to give a strong argument to the CJEU to counter any 
such general ‘state-like’ acceptance of international forum shopping; such an 
interpretation would be difficult to square with, and potentially even undermine, the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU under the above mentioned Article 344 TFEU and 
Article 19 TEU combined.36 This express exclusion of international dispute settlement 
by the Treaties applies in a horizontal manner to all matters brought within the EU 
law balloon. The distinction to be made then is not so much in relation to the 
importance, or not, of the international legal setting invoked or whether or not states 
would engage in certain international practices. It is to the contrary solely determined 
by the nature of the parties and the disputes in which international law is invoked. As 
such, the CJEU has acknowledged that dispute settlement mechanisms included in 
international agreements may be turned to in order to settle disputes between, on the 
one hand, the EU and/or its Member States and, on the other hand, third countries.37 
Triggering external dispute settlement in such cases is not only indicated but 
necessary as the CJEU, being the domestic supreme court of the EU, has no 
international jurisdiction over such disputes. At the same time, the CJEU has 
unequivocally stated in the Mox38 case that to invoke such external dispute 
settlement mechanisms in order to solve disputes between Member States, and most 
likely also between the EU and its Member States, for matters falling within EU 
competence conflicts with the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the CJEU by Article 
344 TFEU combined with Article 4 TEU, the duty of sincere cooperation. The CJEU 
clarified that considering the hierarchy of norms, dispute settlement provisions in 
international agreements even if introducing a specialised forum can never set aside 
those express Treaty obligations. 39 
 Yet this alone is not sufficient to hermetically close the EU law balloon. 
Additionally, the CJEU has indicated that at least the following conditions need to be 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Court? The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the European Union after Opinion 2/13’ (2015) 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 35–56. 
35 Achmea (n 31), see the various blog posts which quickly picked up on this judgment, awaiting 
more thorough scholarly analysis. 
36 Distinct from other international courts set up by agreements, such as the International Court of 
Justice or the ECtHR. 
37 Opinion 1/76 Draft Agreement establishing a European laying-up fund for inland waterway 
vessels ECLI:EU:C:1977:63 at para 5. This is the case for most international agreements. 
38 C-459/03 Commission v Ireland (Mox) ECLI:EU:C:2006:345. 
39 For an analysis, see I Govaere, ‘Beware of the Trojan Horse: Dispute Settlement in (Mixed) 
Agreements and the Autonomy of the EU Legal Order’ in C Hillion and P Koutrakos (eds), Mixed 
Agreements Revisited: The EU and its Member States in the World (Hart Publishing, 2010) 187–207. 
  
met to safeguard the autonomy of the EU legal order.40 First of all, the interpretation 
of provisions of an international agreement pursuant to external dispute settlement 
should not be binding on the EU as concerns the interpretation and application of 
internal EU law.41 Second, the agreement may not lead to an undermining of the 
objectives enshrined in Article 19 TEU, which apparently should increasingly be 
understood as respect for the ‘rule of EU law’ considered as a whole.42 More than 
just guaranteeing the CJEU’s exclusive jurisdiction for reviewing the legality of EU, 
this then also means safeguarding the CJEU’s crucial role in ensuring the uniform 
interpretation of EU law as well as safeguarding the position of Member States’ 
courts.43 Third, the essential character of the powers of the EU and its institutions ‘as 
conceived in the Treaty should remain unaltered’.44 This implies that external dispute 
settlement should not affect the allocation of powers between the EU and the 
Member States, but also that the function of the different EU institutions remain 
unaffected, in particular also that the CJEU is by its very nature a court whose 
decisions are binding. These conditions have been progressively clarified in case law 
but are not necessarily exhaustive. As new questions emerge, for instance in relation 
to the potential effect of ISDS on the autonomy of the EU legal order,45 it is to be 
expected that new and more refined answers may also be formulated by the CJEU in 
the future whenever it considers it necessary to shield the internal application and 
development of EU law from the effect of external and international forms of dispute 
settlement. One can easily understand why for the CJEU it is crucial that the specific 
and autonomous EU balloon is to be shielded from puncturing by international law 
interference, however small, as such would inevitably entail the risk of a more or less 
rapid deflation. 
 With the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the question nonetheless 
emerges more forcefully whether the horizontal scope of the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the CJEU could and should continue to apply without any exception at all. As 
mentioned above, the newly stated objectives of the EU now include contributing ‘to 
the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United 
Nations Charter’ (Article 3(5) TEU).46 Does compliance with this objective of 
necessity require a limitation on the scope of application of the rule of EU law? A 
positive answer would imply that such an objective was not already successfully 
pursued by the EU before the Lisbon Treaty. Although at times there may have been 
friction, there seem to be no compelling examples of (lasting) conflict between EU 
and UN law to support such a view. As will be argued below, this objective in most 
cases can continue to be met by the CJEU, within the framework of its exclusive 
jurisdiction, provided that sufficient attention is given to the resilience or elasticity of 
the EU law balloon in order to avoid situations of open conflict with international law 
in general and UN legal obligations in particular.47    
 It is, however, more difficult to easily reach the same conclusion with respect 
to the express statement in Article 6(2) TEU that ‘(t)he Union shall accede to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms’.48 This new provision inserted by the Lisbon Treaty necessarily and 
unequivocally prescribes adherence to the jurisdiction of the ECHR. Only the terms 
                                                          
40 See also I Govaere, ‘TTIP and Dispute Settlement: Potential Consequences for the Autonomous 
EU Legal Order’ (2016) 1 College of Europe, Research Papers in Law 6. 
41 Opinion 1/91 EEA I ECLI:EU:C:1991:490. 
42 See above. 
43 Opinion 1/09 European Patent Court (n 30). 
44 Opinion 1/00 ECAA (n 6).  
45 See Opinion 1/17 ISDS Provision in CETA (pending) (n 5).  
46 See above. 
47 See below. 
48 It continues: ‘Such accession shall not affect the Union’s competences as defined in the 
Treaties’. 
  
of such accession conditions are left to be negotiated in conformity with the EU 
Treaties. A crucial and novel issue thereby is to what extent, if any, Article 6 TEU 
necessarily limits, or provides an exception to, the horizontal scope of the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the CJEU for all matters of EU law within the EU balloon. In Advisory 
Opinion 2/13,49 the CJEU does not really address this fundamental question. Instead, 
it performs a straightforward and systematic check of the draft accession agreement 
in terms of its compatibility with the autonomous EU legal order. The reference frame 
thus seems to be that the EU legal order and the exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU 
need to be fully safeguarded at all costs, similarly to the standard approach also 
adopted in relation to any other international agreement concluded by the EU. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, the outcome of this assessment was negative and the draft 
accession agreement was found to be incompatible with the Treaties.  
 Opinion 2/13 thereby leaves wide open the thorny question of the post-Lisbon 
interpretation to be given to the core Treaty provisions at stake. Does Article 6(2) 
TEU have equal force and hierarchical ranking to Articles 19 TEU and 344 TFEU? If 
so, how do those provisions interrelate? In particular, how could each provision be 
given an ‘effet utile’, possibly even a renewed interpretation, considering that they are 
on the same footing as norms of primary EU law? It seems that if Opinion 2/13 may 
be subject to criticism, then it is not so much for the CJEU’s repeated and forceful 
attempts to hermetically keep the EU balloon closed. It is rather for doing so without 
coming to terms with the legal complexities introduced by the Lisbon Treaty and a 
lack of reflection about the necessity and possible ways in which to redesign the 
balloon.  
 
III. Necessary Resilience/Elasticity of the Balloon 
 
The hermetically closed balloon of EU law can, however, only withstand the structural 
pressure from international law and be shielded from puncturing if EU law proves 
sufficiently resilient to accommodate international law concerns. This implies that in its 
case law the CJEU, as guardian of the autonomous EU legal order, shows sufficient 
flexibility in addressing issues of international law so as to avoid creating situations of 
open conflict. In other words, it is submitted that the capacity for the EU to maintain 
an enduring structural autonomy necessarily goes hand in hand with continuously 
and proactively fostering a relationship of symbiosis rather than clash with 
international law. Different from a state, the autonomy of the EU legal order is only 
conditionally accepted so long as there is no open conflict in substance with 
fundamental values of constitutional and international law. It is important to note that 
such appraisal ultimately rests not only with the CJEU. It is subject to scrutiny by 
external fora, in particular the Member States’ constitutional courts50 and the 
ECtHR,51 leading to a kind of ‘silent constitutional dialogue’. 
 The CJEU case law seems to meet such concerns in two distinct ways. The 
first option for the CJEU is to ‘incorporate’ or ‘integrate’ international law elements 
into the formulation of EU law, so as to render the requirements under both legal 
systems compatible. The second subsidiary option is to conclude to an 
incompatibility between EU law and international law obligations but at the same time 
to provide a pragmatic intermediary solution so as to avoid an immediate clash 
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between the two legal orders at stake. Up until now this two-pronged approach has 
proved on the whole sufficient to avoid open and long lasting conflicts between legal 
orders, but it cannot be excluded that in the future a different reflection and possible 
Treaty changes may be warranted.  
 For the sake of completion, attention will also briefly be drawn to a last option 
which is expressly written into the Treaties for the benefit of the sole Member States, 
not the EU as such. It concerns the possibility to set aside conflicting EU Treaty 
obligations in favour of complying with prior Treaty obligations or for reasons of 
security interest. These Treaty provisions may facilitate the finding that a Member 
State is in breach of its EU law obligations as it allows the balloon to be gently 
pushed aside without any risk of puncturing.  
 
A. Finding of Compatibility between Legal Orders 
 
In most cases the CJEU endeavours to develop a reasoning in pursuit of a finding of 
compatibility between EU and international law. The delicate exercise consists in 
firmly asserting the specificity of EU law against the backdrop of international law 
obligations of both the EU and its Member States. As the friction between EU law 
and international law increases and solutions become more difficult to find, the CJEU 
however seems to be less inclined to accommodate arguments relating to the sole 
position of the Member States, at least if this would render the finding of a 
compatibility with EU law more precarious.52   
 A major difficulty resides in the fact that the reference frame to conclude to a 
compatibility, or not, between the two legal orders is necessarily international law. 
This implies that it is primarily the CJEU that has to incorporate elements of 
international law into EU law, and to do so to a sufficient extent, rather than vice 
versa.53 But the CJEU is only a domestic court of the EU and not an international 
court, so it is not in a position to render an authoritative ‘international’ interpretation of 
international law. Its interpretations of international law are only for domestic use, 
merely binding on the EU and its Member States within the context of EU law 
applications. It is important, therefore, that the CJEU is as much as possible ‘seen’ to 
defer appreciations of international law to international treaties and in particular as 
interpreted by the competent international courts, such as the ECtHR and ICJ. Where 
no such firmly established external benchmark is at hand, the CJEU is most 
vulnerable to exposing itself to critique of having wrongfully asserted jurisdiction and 
misinterpreted international law.54 
 The express references already made by the CJEU early on to the ECHR and 
to the case law of the ECHR, at a time when the EU Treaties were silent in this 
respect, are clear and early examples of this preferred solution. Such references to a 
foreign legal order and to rulings of a foreign court, in the absence of membership of 
the EU to the ECHR, illustrate the understanding of the CJEU that the new and 
autonomous EU legal order cannot function in complete and splendid legal isolation. 
Instead, symbiotic and complementary systems of law had to be set up. It is interesting 
to point out that a similar approach seemed to be shared by the ECtHR in its famous 
Bosphorus judgment.55 After scrutiny of the case law of the CJEU in terms of judicial 
                                                          
52 See below. 
53 Although a certain extent of mutual influence may be noted, for instance when the ECHR refers 
CJEU case law. 
54 Such as in relation to the rather blunt assertion of the CJEU in the Racke case that the 
procedural provisions in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is not part of customary 
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(Bosphorus). See inter alia T Lock, ‘Beyond Bosphorus; The European Court of Human Rights’ Case 
  
protection and protection of fundamental rights, the ECHR introduced a legal 
presumption of ‘equivalent protection’ in the EU which can only be rebutted in case of 
manifest deficiencies.56 The ECHR is also seen to refer to case law of the CJEU to 
support its own legal arguments.57 
 More recent examples concern the deference to customary international law 
principles and case law of the ICJ, first tentatively in the Racke58 case and more 
openly since the ATAA59 case. This follows earlier case law where the CJEU already 
stated that the EU is necessarily bound to respect international law and not just the 
agreements which the EU itself has concluded.60 As a consequence, in its legality 
control of secondary acts of the EU the CJEU will no longer hesitate to take into 
consideration the need for the EU to respect principles of customary international law, 
even if those are codified in agreements to which the EU is not a party.61 This is 
however to be distinguished from compatibility with international agreements in two 
respects.  
 First, it may be more difficult to determine what precisely constitutes a 
principle of customary international law. As the ATAA case illustrates, the CJEU will 
defer to express rulings of the ICJ where they are at hand.62 It will also be rather 
precautious in assessing whether there are any divergent views among the Member 
States and the EU institutions as to the existence of a generally accepted 
qualification as principle of customary international law.63 
 Second, and somewhat related to the first point, the CJEU has pointed out 
that since a principle of customary international law does not have the same degree 
of precision as a provision of an international agreement, judicial review must 
necessarily be limited to the question whether, in adopting the act in question, the 
institutions of the European Union made manifest errors of assessment concerning 
the conditions for applying those principles.64  
 On the other hand, even though the nature of judicial review enacted by the 
CJEU will thus necessarily be limited to a marginal judicial review, the CJEU has 
accepted that principles of customary international law may also be invoked by 
individuals to contest the validity of secondary EU law.65 This leads to a rather 
paradoxical finding that under certain circumstances respect for international law 
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58 Racke (n 54). 
59 Case C-366/10 Air Transport Association of America (ATAA) ECLI:EU:C:2011:864. 
61 See Joined Cases 21/72 to 24/72 International Fruit Company ECLI:EU:C:1972:115. 
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62 ATAA (n 59) at para 104. 
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64 ATAA (n 59) at para 110. 
65 This is subject to two conditions: ‘first, those principles are capable of calling into question the 
competence of the European Union to adopt that act’, (..), ‘and, second, the act in question is liable to 
affect rights which the individual derives from European Union law or to create obligations under 
European Union law in his regard’. See ATAA (n 59) at para 107. 
  
principles may be better enforceable through the ‘prism’ of the EU law balloon than in 
the international legal order as such. 
 
B. Finding of Incompatibility between Legal Orders 
 
Considering that EU law is not fully tantamount to international law, there remain of 
course a number of situations whereby the outcome under an EU law analysis and 
an international legal analysis may be different and even conflicting. It is therefore 
unavoidable that the CJEU might in a specific case come to a finding of EU law 
which is incompatible with concurrent international law obligations of the EU or the 
Member States. This type of case which cannot be ‘absorbed’ through the resilience 
of the autonomous EU legal order presents the highest risk of puncturing the EU law 
balloon.  
 More often than not, the CJEU seems to anticipate a frontal clash between 
those legal orders by providing a pragmatic intermediary solution. Where needed it 
may allow for the conflicting EU law obligations to be temporarily put aside in favour 
of meeting international obligations in the short term. The condition appears to be, 
however, that in the middle to long term the incompatibility is resolved in favour of 
meeting the specific EU law obligations. Usually such a remedy is to be effected at 
the sole EU and/or Member State level but, exceptionally and if need be, it may also be 
found at the international level with the acquiescence of the third states concerned.   
 Such situations will often arise when the EU has contracted international 
obligations on a wrong legal basis, so that in principle the agreement is null and void 
under EU law but perfectly valid and enforceable under international law, whereas 
there is no real dispute as to its content. It may then suffice to temporarily stay the 
effects of the judgment so as not to disrupt the EU international relations whilst 
allowing for the adoption of the decision concluding the agreement using the correct 
legal basis. The CJEU thereby often expressly points to the need to avoid creating 
serious disruptions or negative consequences for the Union’s relationship to third 
countries which might arise in case the contested decision would be annulled without 
its effects being maintained.66 Especially in a post-Lisbon context of multiple 
competence-related litigation, this remedy seems to have become almost a standard 
practice, often granted on demand of and with agreement of all or most of the parties 
involved.67 Yet, as the rationale is to allow for some time to adopt the necessary 
measures in order to smoothly remove the indicated incompatibility in favour of 
compliance with EU law, the remedy may need to be tailor-made to the international 
context of each case whilst avoiding unwarranted and continuing disruptions to the 
application of EU law. The main variations therefore relate to the duration of the 
remedy offered, ranging from a mandatory fixed number of months,68 to a more 
open-ended phrasing such as ‘the effects of that decision should be maintained until 
it is replaced’.69 In other cases a somewhat in-between position is taken, whereby the 
CJEU maintains ‘the effects of the contested decision until the entry into force, within 
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a reasonable period of time, of a new decision to replace it’,70 thus leaving the 
appreciation of the duration needed to comply with EU law open-ended but not 
limitless.     
 The more problematic cases are those where such a judge-made short term 
remedy to avoid a clash between EU and international obligations is to no avail. 
Typically this would concern disputes relating to content rather than competence, 
which require a renegotiation of the EU position and/or the international 
commitments. Any solution to divert an open conflict between EU and international 
law obligations would then necessarily need to be approved also by the third 
countries involved, without there being any obligation and perhaps little incentive for 
the latter to do so. This is where the importance of the Advisory Opinion procedure of 
Article 218(11) TFEU takes its full weight.71 As the CJEU has pointed out, the very 
purpose of this procedure is  
to forestall complications which would result from legal disputes concerning the 
compatibility with the Treaty of international agreements binding upon the 
Community. In fact, a possible decision of the Court to the effect that such an 
agreement is, either by reason of its content or of the procedure adopted for its 
conclusion, incompatible with the provisions of the Treaty could not fail to provoke, 
not only in a Community context but also in that of international relations, serious 
difficulties and might give rise to adverse consequences for all interested parties, 
including third countries.72  
 Stated differently, the aim of this procedure is to prevent the EU from 
incurring international liability for engaging into international commitments with which 
it will not be able to comply for breach of EU law.73 The existence of this preventive 
procedure is however no guarantee that such conflicts may at all times be avoided. 
Article 218(11) TFEU needs first of all to be triggered by one of the EU institutions or 
a Member State and even so there is no standstill obligation awaiting the outcome. 
Political considerations may take the upper hand regardless of the potential legal 
consequences. The troubled legal path of the EU-USA Passenger Name Records 
(PNR) Agreement is a prime example in this respect, having started with an Advisory 
Opinion procedure to proceed to an annulment case and finally the adoption of a new 
agreement based on the former third pillar outside the control of the CJEU.74 In the 
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aftermath of the New York twin tower terrorist attack, geo-political and international 
security considerations thus seemed to prevail over the strict adherence to EU law 
obligations. In a post-Lisbon setting entailing the abolishment of the pillar structure, 
such matters have now firmly been brought within the EU balloon, as is illustrated by 
the negative opinion of the CJEU in relation to the EU-Canada PNR Agreement.75 In 
order to avoid a potential open clash between EU and international law obligations, 
the EU would be well advised to review and, where need be, also renegotiate the 
other existing PNR agreements in the light of this Advisory Opinion.76 
 In highly exceptional cases, the EU may not of itself be in a position to 
remedy the incompatibility between EU and international law but will instead need to 
rely on the goodwill of the international community to take action at an international 
level. A perfect example of the latter is offered by the Kadi saga concerning financial 
sanctions imposed on individuals in the fight against international terrorism.77 A 
potential conflict was clearly exposed between the respect for fundamental rights in 
the autonomous EU legal order and the UN respectively, which could only 
meaningfully be remedied at the UN level since the EU sanctions list was merely a 
copy and paste of the UN sanctions list. In its first Kadi appeal judgment, the CJEU 
maintained the effects of the contested sanctions regulation with regard to Mr Kadi 
for a maximum of three months so as to allow the Council to fix the shortcomings.78 A 
remedy was found at the UN level, in the form of the introduction of a summary 
narrative and creation of the position of an ombudsperson,79 but this was not in itself 
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‘1.   The Council Decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the Union, of the Agreement between 
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2.      The Agreement between Canada and the European Union on the transfer and processing of 
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76 It remains to be seen whether third countries would respond favourably towards such a request 
for renegotiation. The Commission had posted its intention to do so before Advisory Opinion 1/15 was 
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(last accessed 12 September 2018). 
77 For a more detailed analysis of the Kadi saga in terms of interacting legal orders, see also I 
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78 Kadi I (n 33) at para 375–76.  
79 For an assessment of this remedy, see J Kokott and C Sobotta, ‘The Kadi Case - Constitutional 
Core Values and International Law - Finding the Balance?’ (2012) European Journal of International 
Law 1015–1024. 
  
considered to be sufficient by the CJEU in the second Kadi appeal judgment.80 In the 
end a situation of lasting and open conflict between the requirements under the EU 
and UN legal orders was diverted when the UN Security Council deleted the name of 
Mr Kadi from the UN sanctions list.81 However, this was very much an ad hoc 
solution which prevented a pointed puncturing of the EU balloon, but it does not offer 
a satisfactory and structural answer in the long term. 
 
C. Setting Aside EU Obligations in Favour of International Obligations of 
Member States 
 
Another possibility for the Member States only, is to squarely set aside EU 
obligations including under primary EU law in order to meet conflicting international 
obligations. The EU Treaties have always expressly allowed for such a solution in 
two sets of provisions, Article 351 TFEU concerning prior agreements of the Member 
States and the so-called security exceptions in Articles 346–348 TFEU. Hence it was 
acknowledged from the start that the EU and international law obligations of the 
Member States may not always fully coincide. It is clear, however, that such a 
solution is mainly intended to avoid the Member States incurring international liability 
and may not be invoked by the EU itself. The EU and its institutions are 
unconditionally bond by the EU Treaties by which they were set up. In fact those 
provisions, read together with the Advisory Opinion procedure of Article 218 (11) 
TFEU, and, since the Lisbon Treaty, also the clear objective stated in Article 3(5) 
TEU, may support the point of view that according to the Treaties, the EU is meant to 
always act in compliance with international law obligations; at least the EU Treaties 
do not foresee a situation where it would not. 
 The first possibility laid down in Article 351 TFEU82 allows Member States to 
invoke conflicting prior Treaty obligations so as to temporarily set aside the EU 
Treaties, in line with the international law principles on successive treaties.83 As such 
the underlying idea is that the Member States should not incur international liability 
for setting up or having joined the EU legal order with potentially conflicting 
obligations. In the Burgoa case the CJEU stressed that  
the purpose of that provision is to lay down, in accordance with the principles  of  
international  law, that the application of the Treaty does not affect the duty of the 
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the establishment of the Union and are thereby inseparably linked with the creation of common 
institutions, the conferring of powers upon them and the granting of the same advantages by all the 
other Member States’. 
83 See, eg, A Rosas, ‘The Status in EU Law of International Agreements Concluded by EU Member 
States’ (2011) 34 Fordham International Law Journal 5, 1304–45. 
  
Member State concerned to respect the rights of non-member countries under a prior 
agreement and to perform its obligations thereunder.84  
 Under international law the Member States and the EU each have a distinct 
legal personality thus potentially triggering also distinct international liability. In a 
post-Lisbon setting which in Article 47 TEU expressly acknowledges that ‘the EU 
shall have legal personality, the CJEU however seems inclined to blur those distinct 
legal personalities into one for the sake of application of EU law. As such, contrary to 
Advocate General Sharpston, the CJEU stated in Opinion 2/15 on the EUSFTA, that 
prior Member States’ agreements were simply considered to be ‘replaced’ by later 
EU agreements so that neither the application of Article 351 TFEU nor a mixed 
agreement in order to terminate those prior Treaty obligations was warranted.85 It is 
questionable that such a reasoning is consonant with international law. Furthermore, 
by virtue of Article 351(2) TFEU, the obligation rests on the Member States to 
‘extinguish’ any such incompatibility, which implies to proceed to solve the conflict in 
favour of compliance with EU law.86 The CJEU seems to interpret this as an 
obligation as to result rather than an obligation as to means.87 Again, such an 
approach may put the Member States in a difficult position vis a vis the third 
countries involved, in particular if the latter are unwilling to cooperate, and raise 
issues concerning their international liability. It may thus be questioned whether the 
CJEU has not at least in part forsaken the very raison d’être of this provision to the 
detriment of the Member States as international actors.  
 A second set of rules concern the so-called security exceptions of Articles 
346–348 TFEU.88 These are basically safety valves that may be triggered by Member 
                                                          
84 Case 812/79 Burgoa ECLI:EU:C:1980:231 at para 8. This is in line with Art 30 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, although it should be noted that under EU law Member States may 
only invoke prior ‘rights of third countries’ and hence prior ‘obligations of the Member states’ vis-à-vis 
those third countries in order to set aside the EU Treaties, which is more limited than under international 
law. 
85 Opinion 2/15 EUSFTA ECLI:EU:C:2017:376 at para 254–55. 
86 See Art 351(2) TFEU.   
87 See inter alia Case C‑ 205/06 Commission v Austria ECLI:EU:C:2009:118; Case C-84/98 
Commission v Portugal ECLI:EU:C:2000:359. In the latter case, the CJEU concluded that ‘by failing to 
denounce or adjust the agreement on merchant shipping with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(…)the Portuguese Republic failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles 3 and 4(1) of that regulation’. For 
an analysis, see J Klabbers, ‘Moribund on the Fourth of July? The Court of Justice on Prior Agreements 
of the Member States’ (2001) European Law Review 187–97. 
88Art 346 TFEU:  
‘1. The provisions of the Treaties shall not preclude the application of the following rules: 
(a) no Member State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which it considers 
contrary to the essential interests of its security; 
(b) any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the 
essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions 
and war material; such measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of competition in the internal 
market regarding products which are not intended for specifically military purposes. 
2. The Council may, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, make changes to the 
list, which it drew up on 15 April 1958, of the products to which the provisions of paragraph 1(b) apply’. 
Art 347 TFEU: 
‘Member States shall consult each other with a view to taking together the steps needed to prevent 
the functioning of the internal market being affected by measures which a Member State may be called 
upon to take in the event of serious internal disturbances affecting the maintenance of law and order, in 
the event of war, serious international tension constituting a threat of war, or in order to carry out 
obligations it has accepted for the purpose of maintaining peace and international security’. 
Art 348 TFEU: 
‘If measures taken in the circumstances referred to in Art 346 and 347 have the effect of distorting 
the conditions of competition in the internal market, the Commission shall, together with the State 
concerned, examine how these measures can be adjusted to the rules laid down in the Treaties. 
By way of derogation from the procedure laid down in Art 258 and 259, the Commission or any 
Member State may bring the matter directly before the Court of Justice if it considers that another 
Member State is making improper use of the powers provided for in Art 346 and 347. The Court of 
Justice shall give its ruling in camera’.  
  
States in case they feel that their essential security interests are at stake.89 The 
Treaty expressly mentions the possibility for Member States to set aside the EU 
Treaties inter alia with respect to the divulgence of security related information,90 or 
‘to carry out obligations it has accepted for the purpose of maintaining peace and 
international security’. The latter indirect reference to UN Security Council resolutions 
which are binding on the Member States can of course not go unnoticed and offers a 
solution to potentially conflicting obligations which is firmly in favour of international 
law. An important fact thereby is that under the security exceptions, contrary to 
Article 351 TFEU, the EU Treaty obligations may be set aside without an indication of 
duration nor the requirement to ultimately solve the conflict in favour of compliance 
with EU law. Not surprisingly therefore, the CJEU has ruled that the security 
exceptions present a ‘wholly exceptional situation’91 and do not give a free hand for 
the Member States to derogate from EU obligations at will. Member States have ‘to 
show that such derogation is necessary in order to protect its essential security 
interests’.92 Under Article 348 TFEU the CJEU will exercise a marginal judicial review 
mainly to ensure that the security exceptions are not ‘misused’ by the Member States 
or abusively triggered.93 
 Both sets of rules leave the appreciation and autonomy of the EU legal order 
intact, whilst simultaneously allowing for Member States’ compliance with conflicting 
international law obligations. This may in practice solve an apparent clash with 
Member States’ mandatory compliance with UN obligations under Article 103 of the 
UN Charter. The CJEU has in the past expressly accepted such a solution subject to 
a strict necessity test, for instance in the Centro-Com case where the UK sought to 
reinforce a UN security council resolution in breach of the EU principle of mutual trust 
between Member States.94 It would of course be unacceptable within the EU balloon 
to accommodate the UK measure by giving in on such a fundamental principle as the 
mutual trust between the Member States. The ultimate and perhaps more 
unexpected EU law solution was therefore to allow for the EU legal order balloon to 
be pushed aside by well identified international obligations of the Member State 
concerned, rather than incorporating conflicting elements of international law into the 
EU balloon. Also, this is a necessary form of resilience in order to keep the EU law 
balloon afloat.  
 
IV. Post-Lisbon: Will the Balloon Fly or Deflate? 
 
This exercise of maintaining a sufficient degree of resilience naturally becomes all 
the more important, but also increasingly difficult, as the EU law balloon is inflated to 
its near full capacity. As a consequence, the structural pressure exponentially 
increases whereas the balloon membrane itself becomes more fragile and vulnerable 
to puncturing. The crucial question to determine the viability of the autonomous EU 
legal order in the long run is therefore whether the balancing trick performed by the 
CJEU between a hermetically closed system, but with sufficient resilience to avoid 
conflicts with international law, is still adequate and/or sufficient in a post-Lisbon 
setting. 
                                                          
89 See, eg, M Trybus, ‘The EC Treaty as an Instrument of European Defence Integration: Judicial 
Scrutiny of Defence and Security Exceptions’ (2002) Common Market Law Review 1347–72. 
90 Which was an issue in the Kadi saga above. 
91 Case 222/84 Johnston ECLI:EU:C:1986:206 at para 27. 
92 See, eg, Case C‑ 187/16 Commission v Austria ECLI:EU:C:2018:194 at para 78. 
93 For an interesting analysis of the nature of judicial review relating to the security exceptions, see 
the opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in the FYROM Case C-120/94 Commission v Greece 
ECLI:EU:C:1995:109, esp at para 61–72. 
94 Case C-124/95 Centro-Com ECLI:EU:C:1997:8. 
  
 The challenges which the CJEU and the EU legal order at large face in this 
respect are not to be underestimated. Opinion 2/13 especially has triggered much 
criticism, calling upon the CJEU to be more open to interaction with international law. 
Such a reaction seems to be somewhat misguided though, as the insertion by the 
Lisbon Treaty of the express reference to accession of the EU to the ECHR has not 
raised for the first time, but only fundamentally altered, the nature of the possible 
interaction between those two legal orders. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty this interaction 
was found, as mentioned above, in accommodating and even openly integrating 
ECHR elements into the formulation of EU law, so as to render both legal systems 
compatible as well as complementary. The post-Lisbon quest to find the proper 
modalities for accession of the EU to the ECHR for the first time raises new and 
important issues specifically relating to the structural autonomy of the EU legal order 
in relation to the ECHR. Little or no guidance is currently offered in Opinion 2/13, nor 
in legal doctrine, on how the EU may accede to the ECHR without losing out on the 
specificities of the autonomous EU legal system and potentially thus puncturing the 
balloon. 
 The occurrence of such fundamentally conceptual legal problems is not, 
however, limited to the relationship between the EU and the ECHR legal systems. 
The structural pressure necessarily shifts and triggers concerns for the autonomy of 
the EU legal order whenever legal issues that before were kept outside the EU 
balloon are gradually integrated into EU law. As such, for instance also the extension 
of the scope of the CCP by the Lisbon Treaty to include foreign investments now 
raises fundamental issues relating to the compatibility, or not, of the ISDS provisions 
in important trade agreements such as CETA and EUSFTA with the autonomy of the 
EU legal order. The recent Achmea95 case further fuels this debate in relation to 
Member States BITs. 
 Besides those newly emerging structural issues inherent to the dynamic 
process of inflating the EU balloon, due attention should also continue to be given to 
increasing the resilience of the EU legal order so as to avoid open clashes with 
international law. Also in this respect some troublesome remnants of inconclusively 
or unsatisfactorily resolved issues remain on the table in a post-Lisbon setting. 
Among those it may suffice to raise the following questions which are likely to emerge 
in the future. How to avoid a clash with international obligations of the EU in case the 
CJEU finds that the conclusion of an EU agreement is incompatible with EU law, but 
where no easy EU law solution is possible due to lack of consensus on the 
expediency or content of the agreement? It will be interesting to follow up on the 
above mentioned PNR Agreements saga in this respect in a renewed post-Lisbon 
setting, whereby the pillar structure was abolished and the content of the EU balloon 
enlarged to include the area of freedom, security and justice. Similarly, what would 
be the impact in case the removal of an incompatibility by international means is not 
deemed sufficient to align to EU law obligations? It may suffice here to recall the Kadi 
saga which was ultimately solved but only through an ‘ad hoc’ international remedy, 
namely the pointed removal of the name of Kadi from the UN sanctions list.  
 Ideally, the procedural remedies in the Treaties to avoid a clash between EU 
and international law, the so-called ‘bridges’ between EU and international law, would 
prevent the occurrence of difficult practical legal issues related to conflicts between 
legal systems. In order for the balloon to continue flying, it might be beneficial for the 
CJEU to revisit and further explain those mechanisms. Article 351 TFEU essentially 
seeks to shield Member States from incurring international liability for joining the EU, 
whereas the primary aim of the advisory opinion procedure of Article 218(11) TFEU 
is to prevent the EU from incurring international liability for contracting international 
law obligations which are contrary to EU law.  
                                                          
95 Achmea (n 31). 
  
 As mentioned above, a matter of concern for the Member States is that the 
EU law obligation to ‘extinguish’ the incompatibility of prior agreements in favour of 
EU law pursuant to Article 351(2) TFEU may in practice prove difficult to align to their 
international law obligations. More radical even was the position taken by the CJEU, 
in Opinion 2/15 on the EUSFTA, that prior Member States’ agreements are simply 
replaced by later EU agreements so that neither the application of Article 351 TFEU 
nor a mixed agreement in order to terminate those prior Treaty obligations was 
warranted. There seems to be a sense of urgency in forging a renewed reflection on 
how to smoothly interconnect legal orders whilst avoiding Member States potentially 
incurring international liability for complying with EU law obligations.   
 Similarly, the CJEU has consistently held that the Advisory Opinion procedure 
of Article 218(11) TFEU serves to ‘forestall’ complications that might arise if an EU 
agreement were later on found to be incompatible with EU law. The crucial condition 
thereto is of course that this advisory opinion procedure is duly triggered in case of 
doubt. The Treaty thus contains merely a mechanism but no guarantee that such 
liability can at all times be avoided. A second issue concerns the expected outcome 
in case a negative opinion is formulated by the CJEU. The CJEU seems to have 
understood in the aftermath of Opinion 2/13 on the accession of the EU to the ECHR 
that merely concluding to an incompatibility between legal orders is not necessarily 
perceived as the most constructive and forward looking solution. In the later Opinion 
1/15 on the EU-Canada PNR Agreement, it proceeded to indicate more concrete and 
substantive solutions for the removal of the established incompatibility in terms of 
fundamental rights protection.96 Yet other than merely pinpointing and forestalling 
                                                          
96 Opinion 1/15 (n 75). The CJEU held: ‘The Agreement between Canada and the European Union 
on the transfer and processing of Passenger Name Record data must, in order to be compatible with Art 
7 and 8 and Art 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights: 
(a)      determine in a clear and precise manner the PNR data to be transferred from the European 
Union to Canada; 
(b)      provide that the models and criteria used in the context of automated processing of PNR 
data will be specific and reliable and non-discriminatory; provide that the databases used will be limited 
to those used by Canada in relation to the fight against terrorism and serious transnational crime; 
(c)      save in the context of verifications in relation to the pre-established models and criteria on 
which automated processing of Passenger Name Record data is based, make the use of that data by 
the Canadian Competent Authority during the air passengers’ stay in Canada and after their departure 
from that country, and any disclosure of that data to other authorities, subject to substantive and 
procedural conditions based on objective criteria; make that use and that disclosure, except in cases of 
validly established urgency, subject to a prior review carried out either by a court or by an independent 
administrative body, the decision of that court or body authorising the use being made following a 
reasoned request by those authorities, inter alia, within the framework of procedures for the prevention, 
detection or prosecution of crime; 
(d)      limit the retention of Passenger Name Record data after the air passengers’ departure to 
that of passengers in respect of whom there is objective evidence from which it may be inferred that 
they may present a risk in terms of the fight against terrorism and serious transnational crime; 
(e)      make the disclosure of Passenger Name Record data by the Canadian Competent Authority 
to the government authorities of a third country subject to the condition that there be either an 
agreement between the European Union and that third country equivalent to the Agreement between 
Canada and the European Union on the transfer and processing of Passenger Name Record data, or a 
decision of the European Commission, under Art 25(6) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, covering the authorities to which it 
is intended that Passenger Name Record data be disclosed; 
(f)      provide for a right to individual notification for air passengers in the event of use of Passenger 
Name Record data concerning them during their stay in Canada and after their departure from that 
country, and in the event of disclosure of that data by the Canadian Competent Authority to other 
authorities or to individuals; and 
(g)      guarantee that the oversight of the rules laid down in the Agreement between Canada and 
the European Union on the transfer and processing of Passenger Name Record data relating to the 
protection of air passengers with regard to the processing of Passenger Name Record data concerning 
them will be carried out by an independent supervisory authority’. 
  
potential conflicts, could this procedure not also be used as an important vehicle for 
the CJEU to better clarify the dynamics of the EU balloon and its complex 
interactions with international law? Admittedly, such a proposal implies more 
proactively using the advisory opinion procedure for an additional and explicative 
function. But it is one which is currently lacking and for which there appears to be 
much need and demand. 
 In a post-Lisbon setting, more than before attention has gone to the concept 
of the autonomous EU legal order and how it impacts on the objective to establish 
the EU as forceful international actor.97 In the worst case scenario this concept would 
always be looming and unexpectedly pop up, as some kind of Loch Ness monster, in 
order to upset smooth international relations involving the EU and its Member States. 
Through the use of a balloon dynamics analysis, the above analysis to a large extent 
dispels such a perception. Instead it illustrates that the CJEU’s approach to 
interconnecting the EU legal order with international law is much more structured and 
comprehensive, albeit highly complex and in urgent need of enhanced transparency.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
97 See, eg, C Contartese, ‘The Autonomy of the EU Legal Order in the ECJ’s External Relations 
Case Law: From the “Essential” to the “Specific Characteristics” of the Union and Back Again’ (2017) 
Common Market Law Review 1627–71; J Czuzai, ‘The Autonomy of the EU Legal Order and the Law-
making Activities of International Organizations: Some Examples Regarding the Council’s most Recent 
Practice’ (2012) 31 Yearbook of European Law 1, 452–72; S Hindelang, ‘The Autonomy of the 
European Legal Order’ in M Bungenberg and C Herrmann (eds), Common Commercial Policy after 
Lisbon. European Yearbook of International Economic Law (Springer, 2013) 187–98; JW van Rossem, 
‘The Autonomy of EU Law: More is Less?’ in RA Wessel and S Blockmans (eds), Between Autonomy 
and Dependence (TMC Asser Press, 2013) 13–46; TS Lock, ‘Walking on a Tightrope: The Draft ECHR 
Accession Agreement and the Autonomy of the EU Legal Order’ (2011) Common Market Law Review 
1025–54. 
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